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Abstract 
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Abbreviations 
 
AC  Alternating current 
CO2  Carbon dioxide  
COP21  21
st
 Conference of the Parties (2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference) 
DC  Direct current  
DG  Distributed generation 
DNO  Distribution network operator 
EES  Electrical energy storage 
ETS  Emissions Trading Scheme 
EU  European Union 
EU-28  28 countries of the European Union 
EV  Electric vehicle   
FIP  Feed-in premium 
FiT  Feed-in tariff 
GB  Great Britain 
GDP  Gross domestic product 
GHG  Greenhouse gas emissions 
GW  Gigawatt 
GWh  Gigawatt hour 
kW  Kilowatt 
kWh  Kilowatt hour 
LMP  Locational marginal price 
MS  Member State (of the European Union) 
MW  Megawatt 
MWh  Megawatt hour 
OPEX  Operating expenditure 
PFiT  Premium feed-in tariff 
PPA  Power purchase agreement 
PSP  Pumped storage plant 
PV  Photovoltaics (solar) 
R&D  Research and development 
RD&D  Research, development and demonstration 
RES  Renewable energy supply 
RES-E  Renewable energy supply of electricity 
RO  Reliability option 
ROC  Renewable obligation certificate 
SO  System operator  
TEM  Target Electricity Model (in the European Union) 
TW  Terawatt  
TWh  Terawatt 
UK  United Kingdom 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2014, the European Council confirmed the EU’s 2030 targets for tackling climate 
change as a reduction of at least 40% against 1990 greenhouse gas emissions and increasing 
the share of renewable energy in total gross energy production to 27%. Across Europe, 
governments are putting in place the legislation to deliver on these targets.  
Given the difficulties of decarbonizing transport and heating, the electricity sector will 
continue to bear a significant burden arising from economy-wide decarbonization. Achieving 
this will require high shares of renewable energy supply (RES) in the electricity system, in 
light of the limited opportunities for expansion of hydro power and widespread resistance to 
nuclear power. Fortunately, rapid technological progress in wind and solar energy, combined 
with increased use of interconnection, existing hydro resources, new battery technologies and 
an increased role for the demand side (facilitated by smart meters) suggests that a high-RES 
electricity system is not only a necessary outcome of the 2030 policy targets but also a 
realistic future scenario. 
To date, Europe has made remarkable progress in creating liberalized and competitive 
wholesale markets for trading electricity within and across national boundaries. The 
liberalization process, beginning in the 1990s, was accompanied by large-scale private 
investment in gas-fired power generation, which cut costs, reduced CO2 emissions and 
improved environmental quality. The creation of competitive wholesale markets with hourly 
or half-hourly varying prices was the central mechanism for matching supply and demand, 
and until the mid-2000s in some countries also for directing generation investment.  
The advent of variable RES with high upfront capital costs but very low short-run 
running costs has led to a reduced role for the market in guiding investment.
1
 Governments 
now dominate by setting the subsidy regimes and capacity mechanisms that determine new 
generation investment.
2
 The share of renewables in EU-28 electricity production has 
increased remarkably over the past decade to reach 28% in 2015, driven by generous 
subsidies and priority dispatch connection terms. However, raising the renewables (energy) 
share to around 50% or more
3
 by 2030 will be challenging without substantial modifications 
to the current “1st generation” market design. 
In this paper, we review the evolution of liberalized electricity markets and EU 
renewables and climate policy to date. We note the unintended problems which have arisen 
under the current market design and existing RES subsidy schemes. We then outline key 
elements of a “2nd generation” high-RES market design, which provides better price signals, 
better incentives for RES investment and operation, and greater system flexibility. 
                                                        
1
 We use the term “variable RES” to encompass fluctuating renewables sources (e.g. wind and solar 
power). Other terms used in the literature include “intermittent” and “non-dispatchable” generation. 
2
 Capacity markets are now used in tighter markets in the face of low energy prices and reluctance to 
invest in the firm and flexible capacity (e.g., fossil fuel generation plants, storage) that are currently 
needed to meet reliability standards. 
3
 The 2016 EU Reference Scenario [1, p. 64] shows that current policies are expected to result in a 
43% RES share in electricity by 2030. Meeting the EU’s 2030 energy and climate targets is modelled 
to require a 48-55% RES share [2, p. 73].  
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We begin by advancing six principles of good electricity market design. These 
include: correcting as directly as possible the market failures in current market designs; 
allowing for appropriate cross-country variation in market design; using price signals and 
network tariffs to reflect the value of all electricity services; collecting network fixed costs in 
as efficient and equitable a way as possible; de-risking low-carbon investment; and retaining 
the flexibility to respond to new information on the attractiveness of different low-carbon 
technologies. We then provide a more detailed analysis of the key elements of a new market 
design and present a number of policy recommendations. 
Our review of the literature suggests that there are still substantial short-term benefits 
of further European cross-border market integration (equal to around 2-3% of overall 
generation costs) and significant potential value in increased interconnection. Interconnectors 
exploit differences in wind and sun conditions across regions and so reduce supply 
variability; higher RES penetration further raises the value of market integration. We argue 
that it should be a policy priority to ensure proper remuneration of the services provided by 
interconnectors so as to incentivize efficient private investment, including for more 
connection to market areas with large hydro reserves such as Norway. 
Next, we discuss the challenges around the widespread uptake of electrical energy 
storage. We observe that the potential of electric storage, including from electric vehicles 
(EVs), remains tiny compared to existing pumped and hydro storage. Battery storage looks 
likely to play two main future roles: deferring upgrades in transmission and distribution 
systems by shaving peak use, and improving the management of power flows on the 
electricity network by varying the charging rates of EVs. The surrounding incentives and 
business models that will allow batteries to capture this value still need to be clarified. 
We then examine possible improvements to the design of renewable support 
mechanisms, which yield better signals around where to locate renewables across Europe. We 
suggest a move from current output-based (per MWh) feed-in-tariffs to support more based 
on capacity, for which procurement prices are determined by auctions. As the system 
becomes more capital-intensive (rather than fuel-intensive), such competitive RES auctions 
can reduce current market distortions and help further bring down the cost of capital. 
We identify issues arising from the current pricing of transmission and distribution 
services. We suggest that network charges for distributed generation (DG), such as rooftop 
solar PV, need to be made more efficient. Current charging mechanisms have led to 
distortions and wealth transfers from poorer to richer households; these are rising in 
magnitude in the face of potentially large uptakes of solar PV, electric vehicles (EV) and 
distributed electric energy storage (batteries) and need to be considered alongside other 
policy objectives. We recommend that the apportionment of charges between fixed, off-peak 
and peak use of system charges needs to be changed to be more cost-reflective. 
We then turn to improvements to the design of power and ancillary service markets. A 
system dominated by variable RES enhances the need for more granular pricing of electricity 
over space and time. The scope for nodal pricing of electricity has increased in tandem, given 
recent improvements in computing power and smart metering. A move towards more 
granular electricity prices will help improve location decisions for generation investment, and 
enhance the value of greater system decentralization. 
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Finally, we discuss risk management and long-term contracting in a high-RES system. 
We suggest less reliance on politically-backed long-term indexed price contracts that have 
recently been used to support renewables and nuclear investment. The preferred design of 
capacity auctions should employ “reliability options” because these help retain efficient spot 
prices. Policy should support the deepening of markets for forward contracts and employ 
long-term procurements contracts only where necessary to reduce risk and the cost of capital.  
While our arguments are applicable across different European countries, many of our 
specific examples are drawn from Germany, Italy, the island of Ireland, Spain and the UK. 
We touch on other elements of market design only as by-products of this analysis, including 
demand-side response, related issues arising for retail electricity markets, and optimal support 
mechanisms for low-carbon RD&D. Other important topics such as the impact of future 
electrification of heat are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the economics of liberalized 
electricity markets and the EU’s renewables and climate policies. 4  Section 3 gives an 
overview of the market impacts—good and bad—that renewables have had to date. Section 4 
sets out principles for electricity market design in a high-RES world. Section 5 presents our 
analysis and recommendations for (i) interconnectors and market integration, (ii) electric 
energy storage, (iii) RES support mechanisms, (iv) distributed generation, (v) short-term 
pricing as well as (vi) long-term contracting and risk management. Section 6 offers broader 
concluding remarks on policy design for a high-RES future. 
 
2. Liberalized electricity markets and EU renewables policy 
 
2.1. Liberalized electricity markets and market failures 
 
Electricity involves a range of services: its wholesale value is made up of the energy value 
(kWh), the value of reliability (i.e., the ability to meet demand) provided by capacity (kW), 
and the quality of service at a particular location, as provided by ancillary services (e.g., 
frequency response). 
Electricity generation involves several market failures. Perhaps the most important 
such failure lies in environmental externalities, notably air pollution and carbon emissions 
[5]. Renewables such as wind and solar PV are cleaner than fossil fuels, but more capital-
intensive than traditional generation assets, and pose new challenges to managing the 
electricity system due to the non-synchronous nature of variable generation [6]. Their 
deployment comes with substantial learning benefits that spill over to other market 
participants; without proper support, learning and R&D in such new technologies may 
therefore be insufficient from a social viewpoint [7]. 
 Legislative packages since 1996 have opened the EU electricity sector to vertical 
unbundling and competition. In liberalized markets, large players in the wholesale market 
may be able to exercise market power to drive up prices—especially when capacity is tight 
[8]. This is one motivation behind wholesale price caps, which limit market power in the 
                                                        
4
 For a useful book-length analysis of liberalized electricity markets and EU climate and energy 
policy, see respectively Stoft [3] and Buchan and Keay [4]. 
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short run. However, they in turn lead to the problem of “missing money” [9]: prices do not 
fully reflect scarcity in tight market conditions, reducing profitability and leading to 
underinvestment in capacity over the longer haul. Similarly, the presence of “missing 
markets” [10], such as the lack of forward prices over longer horizons for all products 
(capacity, energy and quality of service) and the carbon externality, impedes efficient risk 
management and can exacerbate underinvestment.
5
  
This wide range of market and policy failures means that electricity cannot easily 
“self-organize” in the way that many other industries do (see, e.g. [12]). At a minimum, 
policymakers need to create a framework within which the private sector can deliver on 
climate targets at acceptable costs while still supplying reliable power over the short and long 
term. 
 
2.2. EU climate and renewables policy 
 
EU renewables policy is guided by three main objectives: (i) to secure energy supplies that 
ensure reliable provision; (ii) to create a competitive environment for energy providers to 
deliver affordable energy prices; and (iii) to support sustainability by lowering greenhouse 
gas emissions, pollution and fossil fuel dependence [13].  
The 2009 EU RES Directive (2009/28/EC) put forward a legally binding target for 
renewable energy sources to cover 20% of total EU energy consumption by 2020.
6
 For many 
EU Member States (MSs), electricity is likely to be the leading sector, so the national RES 
targets imply significantly higher shares of renewable electricity. In the UK, for example, a 
15% overall RES target might require a RES electricity (RES-E) share of 30-40%. 
The importance of deep decarbonization of the electricity sector arises because of the 
difficulties in decarbonizing transport and heating—which are shared across much of Europe. 
Coupled with the limited scope for nuclear new build up to 2030, this suggests that high 
shares of renewables in the electricity system by 2030 are going to be critical for achieving 
climate targets. Reaching the 2030 target of a 40% GHG reduction is modeled to require 48-
55% of electricity from RES, depending on the degree of ambition on energy efficiency and 
overall renewable energy share [2]. However, it is also important to note that variable 
renewables are modelled to be 28-40% of electricity production by 2030 across the EU-28 
electricity system [2, p. 73], so there will continue to be significant non-variable RES as part 
of total RES. 
The 2015 Energy Union Package [14], clarified and updated in the 2016 Clean 
Energy Package, proposes integrating RES-E through market-based schemes. It also 
envisages greater longer-term policy coherence through a stable investment framework that 
reduces regulatory risk for investors and achieves security of supply. There will be an EU-
                                                        
5
 Even in Germany, the EU country with the most liquid forward markets, virtually no prices exist 
beyond a 3-4 year horizon. See ECA [11] for a recent overview of European forward markets. 
6
 The first EU Directive (2001/77/EC) set a target of 12% of gross inland energy consumption from 
renewables for the EU-15 by 2010—with an expectation that 22% of electricity would be from RES. 
Countries set national indicative targets for the consumption of electricity produced from RES; for 
electricity, heating and cooling, these allowed for differences in RES potential, wealth and starting 
points. 
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wide target of 27% of gross final energy from RES by 2030, supported by voluntary 
commitments and reporting—rather than mandatory national targets.  
 An important feature of EU policy is that it sets targets for both RES and carbon 
emissions reductions. The RES target is designed to encourage MSs to continue subsidizing 
RES above the value of the carbon saved to compensate for learning externalities that 
continue to drive down costs. However, since the RES target also reduces emissions, it 
decreases the carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (for a given CO2 
cap), which in turn perversely favours more emissions-intensive generation—unless the cap 
is suitably adjusted at the same time. Böhringer et al. [15] estimate that the costs of meeting 
the 2020 climate targets are substantially raised by inconsistencies between different targets, 
relative to a very modest welfare loss under a theoretical least-cost policy.  
There are very different jurisdictional trade-offs within the “Energy Trilemma”. 
Germany has achieved its RES objectives and maintained security of supply at considerable 
domestic cost and increased CO2 emissions from its nuclear phase-out—together with large 
spillover benefits for the rest of the world. German consumers have paid €125 billion in 
higher electricity bills for RES support schemes in the years between the 2000 Renewable 
Energy Act (EEG) up to 2015; it has been estimated that, over the next 20 years, overall costs 
may exceed €400 billion [16].7 By contrast, the UK has set ambitious binding environmental 
targets but has emphasized achieving them at reasonable cost, and hence committed subsidies 
more cautiously than other countries [17] - although it is currently at risk of missing its 2020 
RES target and breaching the Levy Control Framework that limits RES subsidies [18].
8
 
 
3. Impacts of renewables on EU electricity markets to date 
 
Current market designs have achieved substantial learning gains across renewable 
technologies. Solar PV costs fell to less than one-tenth of their 1992 value in the 20 years 
thereafter; costs continue to fall as deployment rises, with an estimated learning rate of 17-
22%,i.e., for every doubling of the installed capacity, unit costs fall by 17-22% in real terms.
9
 
The learning rate for onshore wind has been estimated at 7% and for offshore wind at 9% [19, 
21]. A key point that is the learning spillover from these renewable technologies depends on 
their installed capacity, not the subsequent output generated. Of course, there is considerable 
                                                        
7
 There is an intense political debate over supporting the development of renewable power 
technologies in Germany that goes back to the 1980s. Its 1990 feed-in-law created a market space 
which supported the growth of a political network empowering renewables and the rapid deployment 
of RES after the Renewable Energy Acts (EEG 2000 and 2014). 
8
 The Global Apollo Programme [19] calls for a global effort to combat climate change by supporting 
low carbon technologies such as renewables, to be achieved by sharing the support burden more 
equitably among as large a coalition of countries as possible. If successful, this would enhance the 
attractiveness of such programmes to each country, as their efforts would collectively have a higher 
pay-off. 
9
 The higher figure comes from ITRPV [20]. This is consistent with Rubin et al. [21] for one-factor 
models that attribute all cost reductions to deployment, whereas two-factor models that separately 
identify R&D lower this figure to 12%. 
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uncertainty about the precise degree of learning [22, 23] but it is clear that cost reductions 
have been very large as renewables’ installed capacity has risen.10 
In the short run, the addition of zero marginal cost RES shifts the supply curve to the 
right, causing the wholesale price and capacity utilization rates of coal- and gas-fired plant to 
fall.  On some days, notably in Germany, high RES has led to negative prices as system 
operators (SOs) have lacked the transmission capacity to wheel the surplus power to areas 
with a positive price.
11
 This is a perverse consequence of only paying subsidies to RES 
provided they are dispatched, coupled with priority dispatch; it is avoided in Ireland, which 
prohibits negative price bidding by RES. 
The magnitude of the ensuing price declines was not widely foreseen, neither by 
policymakers nor many of the energy companies themselves—who continued to invest in 
base-load fossil fuel power plants in anticipation of high wholesale prices and high capacity 
utilization. Figure 1 illustrates the downward trend in Germany: over 5 years, wholesale 
prices have fallen by 50%. While other factors, such as falling fossil fuel and carbon prices 
also played a role, the estimates by Hirth [25] suggest that almost half of the German 
electricity price decline can be attributed to the expansion of RES. These price reductions 
have essentially shifted rents from conventional electricity generators to consumers [26]. 
Relatedly, wholesale price volatility has increased. 
 
Figure 1: Wholesale power price in Germany 
(monthly average of day-ahead auction price) 
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISE 
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 How much of these cost reductions has been caused by EU policy, rather than actions of the rest of 
the world, is more difficult to estimate.  
11
 The merit order effect is, in itself, not a market failure. It may simply be the efficient outcome of 
the workings of demand and supply in a competitive market where low marginal-cost technologies 
displace higher-cost rivals. However, when negative prices are a result of RES producers bidding to 
be dispatched to earn a subsidy and displacing all positive price-setting plant, then it does become a 
market failure that distorts the wholesale price. See Würzburg et al. [24] for an overview of studies of 
the merit-order effect in Germany. 
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Over the longer run, this “merit order effect” can have other consequences. The 
downward pressure on wholesale prices undermines the investment incentives of fossil-fuel 
generators, which are in the medium term needed to provide firmness and flexibility to the 
system, thus potentially undermining security of supply [27]. From the viewpoint of 
conventional generators, the “merit order effect” exacerbates the problem of missing money. 
More RES can also weaken the role of forward contracting in alleviating market power in 
wholesale electricity markets [28] - and lead to higher prices in situations where the RES 
capacity factor is low [29]. 
The evidence on the impact of RES on market power is also mixed. In the Italian 
wholesale market (IPEX), market power was considerably weakened by RES competition 
during peak hours (over 2010 to 2013). Yet market power was exacerbated during some off-
peak hours, in the absence of solar RES in particular zones, in which congestion yielded 
market splitting—and hence increased the ability of incumbent generators to raise prices [30]. 
The situation may be worsened as more fossil-fuel plants close, further reducing capacity and 
competition in off-peak hours. As a result, market surveillance will need to evolve with RES 
penetration to distinguish between actual scarcity (which can be efficient) and abuse of 
market power. 
High levels of variable RES like wind and solar PV can create considerable problems 
for delivering reliable and secure electricity supply (although if properly incentivized, they 
can also offer some ancillary services). The system requires firm replacement when they are 
not available (on windless nights), and it also requires inertia or other forms of frequency and 
voltage stabilization, that is, flexibility services to maintain quality of service. In Italy, for 
example, the rise of RES has resulted in an increase in critical load-following requirements 
for conventional plants, and with that a need for additional reserves and a risk of excessive 
priority-dispatch generation (“over-generation”) in some hours, and a worsening of power 
quality [31, p. 136].
12
 Ancillary services are becoming increasingly scarce as conventional 
synchronous plant is displaced or exits because of inadequate revenue. System Operators and 
regulators are already increasingly seeking to ensure adequate flexibility services, e.g., on the 
island of Ireland (Irish Republic and Northern Ireland) through the DS3 program [32] and in 
GB by way of National Grid procuring additional fast frequency response.  
While all generation technologies impose costs on the rest of the system, the 
“integration costs” associated with variable renewable generation have recently received 
much attention. These include costs associated with grid expansion, increased balancing 
services, and more flexible operation of thermal plants. The synthesis of estimates from the 
literature by Hirth et al. [33] suggests that, at RES penetration rates of 30-40%, system-level 
integration costs are 25-35 €/MWh, of which a large fraction is made up of the lower and 
more variable capacity utilization of conventional generators.
13
 UKERC [34] estimates that, 
at very high levels of penetration (50%), system costs could be between £15-45 (€17-
51)/MWh, declining with the flexibility of the system. These figures vary by country and are 
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 High levels of variable RES increase the share of non-synchronous generation and make the system 
more vulnerable to rapid changes in frequency. Synchronous generation has a high inertia in the 
spinning turbines that reduce the rate of change of frequency. 
13
 We note that these integration costs are comprised of a mix of efficiency losses and transfers. 
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subject to uncertainty but it is clear that estimated renewables’ integration costs account for a 
significant fraction of overall electricity prices.  
In summary, the “1st generation market design” has accommodated RES shares to up 
to almost 30% of generation capacity, with a variety of impacts – some anticipated, others 
less so. Countries have adapted in different ways, depending on their generation mix and 
degree of interconnection to their neighbours. Yet the existing design is reaching the end of 
the road: it cannot adequately cope with the scale of Europe’s COP21 climate commitments. 
Indeed, a recent EU-28 study [1] estimate that the share of renewables in electricity rises 
from 28% to 43% by 2030 under current policies—but this does not deliver on the 2030 
climate targets. 
What is needed is a market design that can support the delivery of the very high levels 
of renewables that will be required to meet the EU’s climate goals. A key challenge lies in the 
uncertainty around future technologies and other market disruptors such as the rate of decline 
in distributed generation (DG) costs and consumer responses to smart metering.  
 
4. General principles for electricity market design 
 
This section sets out principles for improving electricity market design for a high-RES world. 
The economist’s ideal market design is that of “complete markets” in which all products and 
services are efficiently priced by the marketplace (see [35]) to reflect their economic cost and 
value: 
Time – electricity prices are determined at a very granular temporal level, e.g., second 
by second, now and for trade in the future, up to 10-30 years hence; 
Space – prices vary at a granular spatial level – perhaps at each connection point in 
the network, reflecting how demand or costs differ across locations; 
Carbon and other emissions – climate and air pollutant damages are priced at their 
social cost and thus incorporated into decision-making by companies. 
The EU’s current Target Electricity Model is very incomplete in specifying the desirable 
changes; its market design fails on all of the above criteria: pricing is too coarse over time 
and space—and carbon emissions remain under-priced.14 
The ideal is unattainable in practice but it provides a strong vision for a “2nd 
generation market design” to work towards. The desirability of more granular temporal and 
spatial prices at the wholesale level applies even without reference to climate concerns as the 
need for more types and volumes of flexibility services increases. The EU’s climate targets, if 
anything, strengthen the case for efficient market design given the need to price externalities 
as well as the case for minimizing overall system costs whilst achieving reliability. 
The following principles are a high-level guide to shaping future policy. In practice, 
there are a variety of political and institutional constraints around market design. Important 
considerations include a widespread public preference for offshore over onshore wind 
installations (despite their higher costs) and the political infeasibility of (new) nuclear 
                                                        
14
 The most efficient policy would be an economy-wide carbon price set at the social cost of carbon—
yet this does not appear feasible in the near term. In any case, a more ambitious future RES target 
should go hand-in-hand with a tightening of the ETS cap so as to preserve the carbon-pricing signal. 
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generation in countries such as Germany. The principles explicitly allow for flexibility across 
different countries and in light of new information about technologies. 
 
Principle 1: Correct the market failures as close as possible to their source, relying on 
subsidiarity as much as possible. Guided by the “principle of targeting” [36], market 
failures should be corrected at the national or EU-wide level. Climate change is inherently a 
global problem while RES targets are a way of equitably allocating the cost of RD&D across 
MSs to deliver learning benefits. Similarly, rules and standards for electricity trading and 
auction design benefit from an EU-wide approach. However, many details of market design 
can be left to MSs, subject to fair trading across borders. 
 
Principle 2: Allow for appropriate cross-country variation in market design across MSs 
rather than a one-size-fits-all solution. Countries differ significantly in the quality and 
quantity of their resource endowments, their patterns of electricity demand over the course of 
the day and the year, the reserve capacity given existing generation assets, the stability of 
institutional and policy frameworks, the legacy interests protecting the status quo, and in the 
willingness of consumers to adjust their behaviour. Some countries will thus be able to push 
towards a better market design more strongly and/or quickly than others. Moreover, ensuring 
security of supply is inherently a local issue (albeit with ramifications across borders).  
 
Principle 3: Use price signals and regulated network tariffs to reflect the value of all 
electricity services and deliver the least system cost solution. An efficient market design 
uses prices to signal the value of all electricity services provided [35], with the goal of 
alleviating the “missing money” problems that arise when some services are not appropriately 
remunerated. This has a long-run and a short-run dimension—ensuring the right location for 
investment (in renewables and other forms of generation) and an efficient dispatch once 
connected. This delivers the desired level of low-carbon electricity at least overall cost to 
consumers.  
 
Principle 4: Collect the difference between the regulated allowed revenue and efficient 
prices in the least distortionary way from final consumers. This difference amounts to a 
levy to finance the natural monopoly akin to a tax. Good public finance principles imply that 
it should be targeted on final consumers rather than producers (such as generators or storage 
operators) and should be concentrated on inelastic demands [37]. Since capacity demands are 
usually less elastic than energy demands, this generally favours capacity charges. As with 
taxation more generally, this is subject to fairness considerations.
15
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 In general, the least distortionary way of collecting revenue is by individual lump-sum charges—
but the information required makes these impractical. The case for charging final electricity 
consumers rather than collecting any shortfall through general taxation aligns with the benefit 
principle of taxation: beneficiaries should, to the extent that their benefit can be measured, make up 
any shortfall. Where the benefits are to the whole population (e.g., from mitigating climate change) 
there is a good case for financing their delivery from general taxation. 
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Principle 5: Efficiently “de-risk” the financing of investment as the electricity system 
becomes more low-carbon and capital-intensive. A high variable RES (and zero carbon) 
system is relatively more capital-intensive than the fossil-fuel system of the past but requires 
sufficient flexible back-up capacity. This enhances the importance of efficiently de-risking 
investment as far as possible within a stable regulatory framework that helps minimize the 
cost of capital. That involves balancing the allocation of risk to those best able to bear it 
(normally consumers) while retaining incentives to manage that risk (normally the owner of 
the plant) and avoiding problems of “missing markets”.16  
 
Principle 6: Retain flexibility to respond to new information on the attractiveness of 
different low-carbon technologies. Over time, new information will become available on 
the relative costs and benefits of different technologies that reduce emissions or enhance 
flexibility. Policy should create possibilities for such learning (e.g., via auctions) and 
experimentation, providing support for promising technologies where appropriate. 
 
The analysis in the following section applies these principles to develop a set of policy 
recommendations for a future high-RES European electricity system. 
 
5. Economic analysis of key market-design elements  
 
Variable RES presents some different challenges to balancing supply and demand than 
conventional generation. These can be addressed in three broad ways: (1) demand and supply 
can be shifted over space (via interconnectors and transmission links) to provide local 
balance; (2) demand and supply can be shifted over time (via storage); or (3) demand and 
supply can be balanced by invoking more flexible responses (e.g., through pricing).  
 This section presents economic analysis of six key mechanisms: interconnection and 
market integration, electricity storage, the design of RES support systems, distributed 
generation, efficient electricity pricing and long-term contracts.  
 
5.1. Benefits of cross-border integration & interconnection 
The rise of variable RES generation further strengthens arguments for greater cross-border 
integration and raises the value of more interconnection within Europe. Interconnectors can 
deliver back-up power when variable RES generators are unavailable; by connecting areas 
with uncorrelated wind, they reduce the variability of that source of supply and dampen the 
volatility of power prices [38].
17
 Sharing reserves across borders reduces the cost of ensuring 
reliability [39]. Modern controllable DC interconnectors can also provide a number of 
flexibility services.  
Ensuring that interconnectors are efficiently used and properly remunerated for all the 
services they can supply (as per Principle 3) both reduces the short-run cost of integrating 
                                                        
16
 The cost of risk increases as the square of the deviations from the average, so sharing risks across n 
identical participants reduces the aggregate cost of risk by a factor of n. Sharing electricity risks 
across millions of consumers for each of which it is a very small share of aggregate expenditure is 
thus much less costly than concentrating it on a company where it would be a high share of profit. 
17
 Unless noted otherwise, our discussion here refers to both AC and DC interconnectors. 
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renewables and increases the attractiveness of investing in additional interconnection [40]. 
Better use of existing interconnectors and investment in new interconnector capacity increase 
the flexibility of the European system to exploit the natural advantages of the system as a 
whole [41]. These advantages include access to hydro reserves (such as those in Norway), 
large amounts of predictable solar power in Italy, Spain and Greece and the often negative 
correlation between wind speeds at locations up to one thousand miles apart (as weather 
fronts move across Europe) with the consequent ability to economize on back-up fossil fuel 
capacity. With high variable RES shares, the real-time supply and demand balancing of 
national electricity systems across the EU is thus typically no longer economically sensible 
(though some systems, such as the island of Ireland, have technically been able to meet large 
fractions of system demand from renewables; see also [6]). 
Denmark and Germany have already benefited substantially from interconnection in 
their roles as leaders in RES deployment. For example, Denmark typically exports surplus 
night-time power to Norway; by reducing Norway’s hydro use, this indirectly stores the 
surplus which can then be exported to Denmark in the day-time to meet any generation 
shortfalls. Much of its wind is exported in winter when co-generated district heating takes 
priority and delivers power to the grid. 
 
Short-term benefits of cross-border integration 
 
The benefits of market integration in the short-run derive from the more efficient use of the 
existing network, and specifically, of the interconnectors via market coupling. The price 
difference between adjacent price zones then reflects the value of capacity on that link, giving 
both a return to the link owner, and signaling where new interconnections might be 
profitable. Market coupling increases the use and value of interconnectors, also encouraging 
investment in new interconnectors over the longer haul.  
Table 1 summarizes the EU-wide short-run benefits of market integration from 
fulfilling the Third Package (by using existing interconnections), as estimated by Newbery et 
al. [41]. The annual total of €3.9bn represents 2.5% of the 2012 value of total EU wholesale 
demand of €150 billion/yr. Table 1 breaks this total down into various sources, estimated 
usually from a sample of observations on individual interconnectors. The arbitrage benefits 
from day-ahead coupling are worth roughly one-quarter of the potential gains, with larger 
benefits from shared balancing resources and avoiding undesirable unscheduled flows. In a 
similar vein, Boffa et al. [42] suggest that even relatively small improvements in 
interconnection can already bring about substantial benefits, and estimate annual gains of 
around €120mn from North-South market integration within the Italian electricity market. 
As variable renewables generation increases, markets such as Norway and the Iberian 
Peninsula, are increasingly attractive for interconnection as their huge storage capacities 
(70TWh and 25TWh, respectively) allow them to act as large batteries, evening out price 
fluctuations over days and weeks. Increasing interconnections to these markets would reduce 
the price volatility arising from changes in controllable output—but leave enough to create 
arbitrage opportunities and maintain the interconnector revenues needed for investment. 
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Table 1: Potential short-run gains from EU-wide market integration 
  ACER sample 2012 EU-28 estimate 
  € million NTC 2012 €'000/MWyr € million Shares 
Day-ahead coupling 300 22,000 13.6 1,010 26% 
Intraday coupling  10,050 2.6 (MWh) 37 1% 
Balancing 575 17,550 32.8 1,343 35% 
Unscheduled flows 988 34,900 28.3 1,360 35% 
Curtailment 19 26,075 0.7 130 3% 
Total gains       3,880 100% 
 
Note: The ACER [43] sample is a subset of all interconnectors. The EU-28 estimate is scaled up using the 
values per MWyr derived from the sample. NTC is Net Transfer Capacity of the interconnectors, a measure of 
their usable size. The values for intra-day coupling are per MWh, curtailment is based on import and export 
flows together.  
Source: Newbery et al. [41] for the results and methodology.  
 
While increased interconnection brings substantial overall (net) benefits, these are not 
necessarily shared evenly across countries or regions ([44]), suggesting that the details of 
different MSs policies should differ (Principle 2). For example, although more efficient use 
of electricity will typically reduce overall carbon emissions, it may raise emissions at one end 
of the interconnector ([45]). A detailed cost-benefit analysis is therefore required to evaluate 
the desirability and efficiency of each interconnection. 
Countries that are interconnected to the Continent through controllable DC links and 
are not part of the meshed Continental network have greater control over what happens in 
their markets without adversely impacting others,
18
 and should thus be granted more 
flexibility, while those impacting neighbours may need more harmonization (Principle 2). 
 
Longer-term interconnector benefits 
 
The day-ahead arbitrage benefits can be estimated by looking at price differences across 
borders. ACER ([43], Figure 84) provides for a sample of 24 such links; for the top 15 
interconnectors, this would be €68,000/MWyr. For a 1,000 MW link this gives revenue of 
€68 million/yr, capable of justifying substantial new investment. Moreover, these revenues 
represent only a fraction of the potential value of interconnections (around 25% in Table 1).  
Newbery et al. [41] estimate the benefits of integrating EU markets for a high-RES 
2030 scenario. The potential benefits of sharing reserves, balancing, expanding 
interconnection where profitable, as well as allocating RES to the best resource locations, 
range from €13-40 billion per year for the EU as a whole. The wide range reflects uncertainty 
about future RES levels and costs as well as fuel and carbon prices. If only half the justified 
transmission is built, benefits fall by €4 billion/year; sharing reserves (rather than targeting 
self-sufficiency) raises benefits by €6 billion/year. 
 
5.2. The medium-term potential of electric energy storage 
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 A Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) has the ability to direct power over AC links but as a 
result can adversely impact other interconnected systems unless carefully coordinated. 
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While interconnection allows balancing over wider areas, storage offers the potential to 
balance over time. Indeed, existing pumped storage schemes were typically constructed to 
deal with inflexible supply, particularly nuclear, in the face of varying demand. Recent 
developments in battery technology, driven largely by laptop computers and mobile phones, 
have considerably lowered the cost of batteries, and the prospective demand for battery 
electric vehicles (EVs) offers hope that prices will continue to fall. This has led many to 
conclude that batteries will be a key element in addressing the growing problems of 
associated with increasing share of variable RES generation. 
However, it is important to retain perspective, especially for the shorter term. 
Batteries currently represent a tiny fraction of grid-scale energy storage overall, making up 
only 3 GWh [46] or 0.1% of pumped storage; Norway alone has 70TWh in stored hydro, as 
noted above. Even if their costs halved they remain extremely expensive. Optimistic forecasts 
for Tesla batteries in 2020 show their levelised running costs at $175/MWh, to which would 
be added the cost of the energy purchased (allowing for storage losses of 10%). This would 
require a very high value for the delivered energy to justify arbitrage. Battery storage, as 
such, is unlikely to be viable for time-shifting supply in current electricity markets [47]. 
In practice, batteries are only justified for the other services they can offer— 
specifically, very fast frequency response and the ability to defer expensive network 
investments in certain places [48]. The main obstacle to their widespread economic use is that 
the fundamentals of electro-chemistry rule out dramatic breakthroughs in efficiency; 
moreover, the cost of providing enough total storage capacity to buffer more than very short-
term fluctuations (of less than an hour) is prohibitive—primarily because of the limited 
number of cycles of charge and discharge that a battery can experience before it degrades 
(though it may be possible to adjust the charging rate of a battery to derive very low-cost 
flexibility services). 
While mass-manufactured battery cells and packs may become significantly cheaper, 
grid-scale battery facilities will, likely, not fall as rapidly in cost. This is because of less 
technological progress in the other elements of grid-scale facility costs; for example, in 
distribution grid-scale lithium-battery storage, cell and pack costs amount to around 40% of 
overall facility costs [49]. This suggests that dispatchable grid-scale batteries may not 
become as widespread as distributed behind-the-meter batteries (which will show up on the 
system in changed demand patterns). 
Pumped Storage Plants (PSPs) represent the most established form of bulk electrical 
energy storage (EES) [50]. Newbery [46] estimates the total global PSP capacity at 2.9 TWh, 
of which 0.4 TWh for the EU. The merit of PSPs is their long life and low depreciation; their 
high capital cost and limited opportunities for capacity additions are serious limitations as 
their capital cost adds £40-£80/MWh to the cost of buying electricity given pumping losses of 
25%. PSPs typically only earn a quarter of their revenue from arbitrage; the balance comes 
from flexibility services, for which they, like batteries, can be very valuable. 
By comparison, hydro capacity was 979 GW worldwide in 2012, generating 3,288 
TWh/year (or 16% of world electricity output), of which 173 GW is located in Europe and 
144 GW in the EU together with Norway and Switzerland [51]. Newbery [40] estimates its 
total hydro reserves at 2,144 TWh—equal to 2,700 times the global PSP capacity. Hydro can 
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be used indirectly as storage by offsetting the variability in RES electricity production. 
Interconnecting EU markets to Norway (with its 70 TWh in dams) is the obvious route, 
subject to the corresponding cost-benefit analysis 
The storage capacity of EVs can be estimated. If their share of the EU car fleet grows 
to 10% by 2025, there could be some 26 million EVs,
19
 which, with 20 kWh/EV, would give 
0.5 TWh for the EU as a whole—which is comparable to current PSP capacity [46]. (Even at 
100% EVs, this would yield “only” 5 TWh.) Moreover, while this may seem large by 
comparison with stand-alone batteries, only a part of it is (indirectly) accessible, in that 
timing of charges provides some demand shifting. However, the EV fleet may not be large 
enough to cost-effectively provide ancillary services until 2030 [52]. 
The large-scale rollout of EVs will require incentives and/or controls over the time of 
charging since otherwise EV owners are likely to charge them at similar times (e.g. after 
work), which would put extra additional pressure on the electrical system. However, evidence 
suggests that EV owners are responsive to time-of-use charging so they can provide demand-
side response [53]. Other studies suggest that the business models around private EV 
participation in electricity markets will be challenging due to high payment expectations of 
vehicle owners for third-party access to their vehicles [54]. 
As the amount of variable RES generation further increases, the volume and value of 
EES will also increase. However, EES is only one of several ways of providing flexibility—
along with, e.g., interconnectors, flexible generation and demand side response (DSR)—and 
is often a very expensive, and thus unlikely to be a cost-minimizing solution (Principle 3). 
While superficially attractive, grid-scale battery storage remains too expensive to use beyond 
those projects where it has very high value-added, such as very fast frequency response and 
relieving network capacity [55, 46]. By comparison, other forms of storage such as using 
PSPs and fossil fuel stocks remain relatively cheap. 
That said, battery storage looks likely to play two main roles in the foreseeable future, 
which policy may support (Principle 6): first, batteries can defer upgrade investment in 
transmission and distribution systems by shaving peak use; second, varying charging rates of 
EVs may improve the management of power flows on the electricity network. 
 
5.3. Designing more efficient RES support mechanisms 
 
There have been many experiments with how to support RES while it has been more 
expensive than fossil generation. RES subsidies such as feed-in-tariffs (FiTs) that offer fixed 
prices for a period have successfully brought forth renewables in large quantities. However, 
in many cases, they have been very generous and pushed up system costs by distorting 
location decisions. Auctions offer a more attractive solution.  
In addition to FiTs, some MSs have used a Premium FiT (PFiT, also known as Feed-
In Premium or FIP), which pays a fixed premium to the current wholesale market price, or a 
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 There are projected to be 255 million cars in the EU by 2025; see 
http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT_EU-pocketbook_2015.pdf  
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green certificate (Renewable Obligation Certificate, ROC) [56].
20
 The first type usually offers 
priority dispatch and places such obligations on the System Operator (SO), the latter two 
options usually place the marketing and balancing obligation on the RES generator. In 2013, 
FiTs accounted for about 58% of supported output, green certificates for 26% and PFiTs for 
16%.
21
 PFiTs are the EU’s currently preferred option. 
 Auctions for RES support used to date have been very competitive, in line with 
Principle 6. For example, the results of the UK’s auctions since 2014 suggest that these 
undercut the administrative prices offered by governments by a significant margin [57]. This 
is supported by international experience in competitive tendering for solar energy, which has 
seen steep declines in procurement costs of both solar and wind installations [58]. Greater use 
of auctions for pre-determined volumes of RES also has the advantage of controlling the 
overall amount of subsidy that governments commit to.  
Auctions can and should be portioned into different technologies according to their 
relative maturity (for example, mature technologies such as onshore wind and solar PV in one 
auction and less mature technologies such as offshore wind in another). Clearing prices 
across these auctions will likely differ, and indeed this is what happened in the UK 
renewables support auction in February 2015.
22
 They can be held regularly to encourage the 
supply chain; the capacity to be procured should adjust over time in line with learning about 
the cost evolution of different technologies. High-cost mature technologies will naturally be 
displaced by lower-cost alternatives, and less mature technologies should only be pursued 
while their prospects of becoming competitive justify the additional support. 
We also suggest the extension of the use of auctions that are specifically aimed at 
promoting smaller scale RES projects. California has had a particularly successful experience 
with regular auctions by individual distribution companies to procure 3-20 MW facilities 
around the distribution system. These auctions have included valuation of some of system 
integration costs and benefits in ranking the winning bidders in the auctions.
23
 
If carbon prices move towards reflecting social costs, the remaining market failure 
associated with RES is the learning benefit. As noted in Section 3, this arises from their 
design, manufacturing and installation – rather than the subsequent operation of the plant. 
Therefore, guided by Principle 1, this suggests that subsidies should be directed towards 
capacity – rather than output, as has largely been the case across MSs to date.24 An attractive 
variant used in China [61] is to specify a FiT for a fixed number of MWh/MW capacity—
e.g., 30,000 MWh/MW for a wind turbine, which is in effect a capacity support, as total 
                                                        
20
 The value of a ROC is determined by the demand for and supply of these certificates, and is then 
added to the wholesale price. The demand is an obligation placed on retailers for a specified fraction 
of their sales, the supply is proportional to metered RES output. 
21
 Figures are based on https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/-/-/7a459aeb-400a-2ba1-9c45-
4e138a834991 (Annex 9). 
22
 See NAO [59] on the use of auctions by government to procure renewables. 
23
 See Anaya and Pollitt [60]. 
24
 If carbon remains underpriced and a MS is unwilling to impose a carbon price floor, then a possible 
“second-best” remedy is an additional subsidy to zero-carbon power, set at the average carbon 
intensity of fossil generation times the shortfall in the carbon price (below the social cost of carbon), 
which would be reduced) over time as the carbon-price shortfalls declines. 
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lifetime subsidy does not depend on the output in any individual hour, which is therefore 
valued at the spot price.  
Future policy could therefore better target support on capacity (MWs) by offering an 
auction-determined payment per MW for a fixed number of MWh/MW capacity (in addition 
to revenues from wholesale and other markets). This would de-risk the investment by making 
the payment stream predictable (Principle 5) and hence making it more suitable to be bond-
financed. It would also encourage the best locations to be exploited first while not distorting 
the bids of renewable generators in the energy and ancillary services market. It would avoid 
the current situation where RES generators will bid negative prices in the wholesale market, 
up to the value of their lost per MWh subsidy.
25
 As the share of RES rises on the system, this 
would be a way of ensuring that RES, once built, participated on equal and cost-reflective 
terms with conventional generation—in the spirit of Principle 3. 
 The wind and the sun vary over time and space and so will the cost per MWh from 
these sources. But to that cost must be added the transmission and balancing costs. Distant 
wind farms may have higher capacity factors but they incur considerably higher transmission 
costs—and it is that total cost that matters.26 In the case of a FiT or PFiT, if the support price 
is set high enough to even encourage the least-favoured location, then it will over-reward 
those in favoured locations. This raises the cost of procuring a given amount of capacity 
investment (and RES learning benefits). 
By contrast, if RES is supported per MWh/MW of capacity, rather than per MWh of 
output delivered, there is less inducement to locate in distant locations in response to a higher 
incentive per MWh. That has the benefit that it does not over-reward RES in favourable 
locations.
27
 With locational pricing or zonal pricing with bidding zones based on structural 
network congestion, it also discourages excessive connection in constrained locations.
28
 This 
would make better use of the existing network, and reduce the effect of current subsidies in 
exaggerating power flows when the network is congested. Assuming that a plant delivers at 
least the specified number of MWh, the only remaining (minor) distortion towards windier 
but less efficient locations is earning the subsidy more rapidly. 
 
Understanding locational distortions due to feed-in-tariffs  
 
A simple example illustrates how most existing RES support schemes lead to inefficient 
location decisions even with nodal pricing. Suppose that the nodal price in a distant windy 
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 Output payments make it worth bidding a negative price to be dispatched up to the amount of the 
premium (less any variable operating expenditure, OPEX), and this can distort the merit order, as it is 
costless to disconnect wind and PV, in contrast to disconnecting inflexible nuclear and fossil plants 
that are slow and costly to restart. 
26
 The value of power at any time and place does not depend on its source (fossil, nuclear or 
renewable), but the marginal cost of delivering the power to that place should reflect transmission 
constraints and losses (which would be assured by nodal pricing). 
27
 While the discussion here relates to location within a country, there is a wider problem that current 
rules make it hard for any MS to locate RES in more favourable foreign locations and gain credit for 
meeting its target. 
28
 A potential countervailing factor is the widespread public preference against wind installations that 
are located onshore, for example, in proximity to densely populated areas. 
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location is €20/MWh (averaged over hours of wind generation) while it is €40/MWh near a 
major demand centre. The windy location has a capacity factor of 3,000 hrs/yr (i.e. produces 
3,000 MWh/MW capacity) while the demand centre has a wind capacity factor of 2,000 
hrs/yr. So the value of the windy location is €60,000/MWyr and at the demand centre is 
€80,000/MWyr and so more valuable. If a wind investor receives a FiT of €80/MWh in both 
locations, then it would choose to locate in the windy place – where it produces more output 
but less value to society. 
A PFiTs responds to local wholesale prices; it is less distorting than a FiT—but the 
premium element still creates a distortion. If wind is paid a PFiT, say with a premium of 
€40/MWh, then the windy farm earns €(20+40) x 3,000 = €180,000/MWyr and the demand-
centred farm earns €(40+40) x 2,000 = €160,000/MWyr, so incentives still point to the wrong 
location. If the demand centre instead had 2,500 windy hours, the FiT would still favour the 
windy location. But the PFiT would now earn €60 x 2,500 = €150,000/MWyr in the windy 
location, less than the €160,000/MWyr at the centre, and so would locate in the right place.29 
 
5.4. Impacts of the move towards distributed generation 
 
Distributed generation (DG) has been a major trend in the connection of RES in Europe. 
Governments have favoured small-scale renewables with more generous subsidies and this 
seems likely to continue. DG represents electric power generation within distribution 
networks or on the customer side of the network.
30
 It is a leading example of the 
decentralization of the electricity markets. 
 DG consists of small-scale technologies often situated near homes and businesses 
where electricity is used, offering an alternative to large-scale centralized generation and 
potentially reducing line losses. It also offers electricity consumers the prospect of “self-
sufficiency” which may be of intrinsic value to small (often household) consumers (partly 
since it provides tax-free returns on investment by reducing post-tax expenditure on energy). 
DG can be built more quickly than new central power systems, and can eliminate the cost of 
installing new transmission lines. Many forms of DG are cleaner than current conventional 
power, and should be able to provide ancillary services, and can contribute to security of 
supply if consumers switch to it during stress periods [62, 63, 64].  
However, DG has drawbacks. It can be technically challenging to efficiently integrate 
the increasing number of small generation units in an electricity system that up to now has 
been centralised, integrated and planned. A major problem to date has been the lack of 
visibility of DG to the authority charged with measuring capacity adequacy. DG, particularly 
solar PV, may cause voltage instability in parts of the grid [65, 66],
31
 impacting power 
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 The numerical example is kept simple to illustrate the impact of different RES support schemes; 
other considerations may play a role in practice, including whether adding more wind capacity could 
alter nodal prices and the social value of the carbon-emissions reduction achieved by wind capacity. 
30
 In Anglo-American countries it is often called “embedded generation”, in Europe and Asia 
“decentralized generation” or “distributed energy”, while some prefer “small-scale generation”. 
31
 The “50.2 Hz” problem in Germany is a salutary example, see e.g. 
http://www.modernpowersystems.com/features/featuredealing-with-the-50.2-hz-problem/  
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quality. Last but not least, the unit costs of small wind and solar PV installations are typically 
higher than those for larger grid-scale installations. 
DG can reduce losses and the need for system capacity upgrades, so the shift to DG 
over time could in some cases tend to reduce the size of the distribution system, thus also 
reducing overall system costs. But this effect does not look likely to be very material in most 
of Europe [67]. Moreover, greater adoption of EVs (and also of heat pumps) may also cause 
increase loading of the distribution system, thus countering the effects of increased DG. 
DG with battery systems can lead to the possibility of grid-defection, reducing fixed 
network cost contributions from those defecting customers and giving rise to a “utility death-
spiral” [68]. This seems unlikely in Europe since most prosumers need access to the network 
for “export” and prosumers still need “import” capability; having enough own battery storage 
to last through the depth of the winter is not currently an option, even in southern Europe. 
Yet the possibility of large-scale network defection exists—and with it, there are risks 
to the viability of some poorly designed network business/regulatory models. System cost 
comparisons between on-grid and off-grid supply depend on fossil fuel prices, energy subsidy 
charging regimes (often recovered via electricity bills) and the way in which network fixed 
costs are recovered from consumers (see [69]). Some consumers might find it desirable and 
profitable to defect from the network, even though the true economic cost of remaining grid-
connected is lower. 
The combination of a household with PV, a battery and an EV might in the future 
offer a grid defection opportunity in sunny parts of Europe. While this will be appealing to 
some households and could enhance security of supply, it is unclear if it would be efficient 
from the viewpoint of the whole economy. If this does begin to happen, regulators would 
sensibly take steps to ensure that such households are not being effectively subsidised to 
disconnect or undercharged for options to reconnect to the grid—in line with Principle 3. 
 
Charging mechanisms for DG and distortions from net metering 
 
A considerable fraction of RES is of modest scale and locates on distribution networks, while 
roof-top PV is usually behind the meter of the household (although it may be separately 
metered). “Net metering” arises when the meter only measures gross consumption less the 
amount generated on the premises, usually without distinguishing times and hence different 
values for importing and exporting power. Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) are often 
under different ownership from the grid, and pay to connect to the grid, in turn recovering 
that cost from customers. This often leads to DNOs paying an embedded benefit to DG to the 
extent that it reduces the charges paid to the grid operator.  
Most regulated networks use tariffs to recover their average costs, which can be much 
higher than marginal costs—particularly in a mature grid with low demand growth. Worse, if 
the grid has to invest heavily to deliver distant wind energy, and these costs are recovered 
across all DNOs, the difference between average and marginal cost can (and has in GB) 
become very large. Where the DNO pays an embedded benefit to DG for reducing power 
taken from the grid the excess of the average over marginal transmission cost gives a highly 
distortionary subsidy to generation connecting to distribution networks rather than 
transmission networks. It is therefore important for regulators (who are tasked with protecting 
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consumer interests, often with specific duties to protect poor and vulnerable customers) to 
compute the efficient tariffs (moderated to take into account their equity effects) that impact 
location and operating decisions (Principle 3), and target the recovery of any shortfall on final 
consumers (Principle 4) in the least distorting way possible (e.g. by the size of their 
connection, or their specified maximum demand, or in peak winter hours).
32
  
The efficient subsidy to confront DG would be the marginal avoided cost of grid 
reinforcement less the marginal cost of distribution reinforcement required; this might be 
negative, i.e., an additional subsidy. Applying this principle, households with PV would be 
paid the appropriate support for PV but pay for the full network costs of meeting their 
consumption. Such households will still use the network when the sun is not shining – and, at 
least in Northern Europe, the peak is likely to be on dark winter evenings. Yet they usually 
pay the network charges per kWh, so under “net metering” (charges only on net electricity 
consumption, i.e., consumption less PV output) they avoid costs while enjoying the benefits 
of reliable access to power. 
These existing charging mechanisms for DG have been leading to substantial wealth 
transfers between different customer groups in countries with high domestic RES penetration 
and high distribution system costs. Solar PV consumers have lower metered consumption due 
to their own production. This significantly reduces their share of the per kWh costs of the 
distribution system. As revenue cap regulation of the distribution charges requires the same 
revenue to be collected as demand has fallen, per-unit charges have risen and the distribution 
of their payment between different types of households has changed.  
Inspired by the methodology developed by Simshauser [70], we derive the differences 
in network charge contributions between solar and non-solar residential consumers in 
Northern England. A difference of £33.50/year or around 6% of the typical bill (if metered 
import was reduced by 1200 kWh due to having PV in the presence of a 2.792p/kWh 
distribution charge) is what the retail companies pay to the DNO for a non-PV household 
compared to the households with solar PV. This effect is magnified by the retail tariff (where 
the unit charge is 14p/kWh, more than twice the pure energy cost). Households with solar PV 
are therefore benefitting from the current tariff scheme although their solar power generation 
does not seem to affect their overall peak consumption behavior and hence use of the grid. 
This effect is further exacerbated as the charges to fund the PV (and other RES) subsidies are 
levied on net metered consumption  
DG should bear the costs it imposes on the network in a fair and politically acceptable 
fashion. Recent studies have shown that large inequities can arise quite quickly in some 
jurisdictions, for example, in Simshauser’s [70] analysis of PV uptake in South Queensland. 
The existing system favours those with DG—likely richer consumers—who do not bear the 
efficient or fair share of the total system distribution and transmission costs. More generally, 
domestic PV subsidies often have been generous in absolute terms and disproportionately 
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 This accords with the principles of good public finance that revenue-raising taxes should not distort 
production decisions, as set out by Diamond and Mirrlees [37]. It is moderated to the extent that if the 
Government is not willing to take full responsibility for addressing poverty, the regulator may be 
charged to protect vulnerable consumers with e.g. lifeline rates that scale back fixed charges for the 
first kWh/month. 
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taken up by richer households while higher electricity prices affect poorer households 
relatively more strongly.
33
 
 Consequently, the apportionment of charges between fixed, per kW peak and per kWh 
use of system charges needs to be changed to be more cost-reflective—as well as finding 
ways of exempting at least poorer households from financing RES that is largely taken up by 
richer households. These hidden subsidies are becoming more significant as the direct 
subsidy to RES has been coming down. Some jurisdictions outside Europe, notably Hawaii 
and Arizona, have already altered their distribution charging regimes to address this problem 
(by moving away from per kWh import charging).
34
 
 
5.5. Efficient pricing for dispatch and investment 
 
In a low-variable-RES world, demand is fairly predictable and mid-merit fossil fuel plants 
can easily be turned up and down to meet real-time changes in demand or network 
constraints. This cheap controllability meant the value of high-resolution prices (e.g., 5 
minutes or less) was limited. Prices could be set for relatively long periods (30 minutes or an 
hour) and the System Operator (SO) could adjust output (reserves) and/or re-dispatch plant 
within these time windows and across wide areas (regional price zones). 
Today both the need and the scope for much more granular and differentiated price 
signals are already increasing. The supply from variable RES sources, particularly solar PV, 
varies significantly in real time and is less controllable than conventional generation.  
Demand is becoming increasingly flexible and the costs of sending differentiated price 
signals are falling, for example, because of smart metering. Increases in computing power 
suggest that it is possible to more quickly resolve prices to exploit smaller time windows and 
more geographical dispersion [75].  
Despite its potential advantages, arising especially via Principles 1 and 3, nodal 
pricing is currently neither practiced in the EU nor is it encouraged by the Target Electricity 
Model (TEM). Classic results of Schweppe et al. [35] and Hogan [76] show that nodal 
pricing can achieve higher social welfare than less granular pricing approaches. Current EU 
short-run electricity prices are insufficiently granular to properly value flexibility, balancing 
markets within the EU are not yet coupled, and ancillary services remain poorly priced in 
most markets. Nonetheless, nodal pricing should at least be compatible with the TEM.  
The use of short-time interval locational pricing has already spread across US power 
markets, together with wider areas being managed by Independent System Operators (ISOs), 
but remains underutilized across Europe. In the pioneering region of PJM (in the Eastern US), 
so-called locational marginal prices (LMP), which reflect the marginal value of electricity at 
each node, are recomputed by the System Operation (SO) every five minutes.  
                                                        
33
 In the UK, for example, CEPA and PB ([71], p.11) found that expected returns to the PV Feed-in-
Tariff were the highest among a broad range of asset classes (with 5-8% post-tax real returns) while 
DECC ([72], p.12) reported that UK households in the top income decile were 16 times more likely to 
have private PV on their roof than households in bottom income decile. Neuhoff et al. [73] find that 
poor households allocate twice as much of their expenditure to power and show the resulting 
distributional effects of German renewables support policies. 
34
 See Pollitt and Strielkowski [67] on Arizona and Hawaii Public Utilities Commission [74]. 
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Indeed, nodal pricing to reflect the locational value of renewables would complement 
a more efficient European RES support design. Given that much RES is currently paid 
independent of location, the network is inefficiently saturated in high-resource (wind or PV) 
areas. With nodal pricing, excessive location would depress local power prices and thus 
signal the need to locate subsequent renewables elsewhere. The geographic dispersion of DG 
suggests increasing benefits could be realized by pricing which reflects local congestion 
constraints and line losses and avoids the need for expensive re-dispatch. 
Large-scale modelling estimates by Neuhoff et al. [38] suggest large welfare gains 
from a shift to nodal pricing and market integration in a future high-RES world (relative to a 
market design with nationally-determined prices). These gains arise from a combination of 
better use of the network, cost savings from more efficient dispatch, and lower overall 
electricity prices. More generally, sharper supply and demand signals would also allow better 
price arbitrage between nodes and across interconnectors, and better use of storage. 
A shift to nodal pricing does carry the risk of reducing market liquidity and increasing 
market power but to the extent that more granular prices more accurately reflect the value and 
cost of power, they are valuable to the system. Markets with nodal pricing tend to have 
sophisticated in-house market monitoring functions (such as the independent market 
monitoring function associated with PJM). More generally, such a shift would require 
adaptation of market players and institutions. However, the existence of better separation of 
transmission from the rest of the electricity system than in the US and stronger national 
regulatory authorities suggests it is possible for Europe to rise to such a regulatory challenge 
(see [77]). 
Moreover, the current reliance on some ancillary services markets, such as for 
frequency response, could be reduced (in line with Principle 1)—given that these markets 
exist in the first place to maintain supply in the absence of fully granular prices. Ancillary 
services markets themselves can also move from bilateral contracting to more real-time 
market-priced products. This would facilitate competition in ancillary services provision 
between conventional generators and new sources of flexibility services such as batteries and 
interconnectors. 
It is possible to mix better nodal and zonal pricing to reflect how local network 
conditions vary across MSs (Principle 2). Zonal pricing is a less granular form of pricing than 
the locational marginal price, with a single market price inside a region (typically a country 
or state). The trade-off is that nodal pricing achieves more efficient dispatch whereas more 
broadly configured zonal pricing gives more trading liquidity. For countries in which binding 
constraints in the transmission system are rare and nodal prices are relatively similar, zonal 
pricing may be preferable given its greater liquidity for traders. Other countries, which have 
more serious transmission constraints or are affected by large and variable transit flows, can 
pursue more fine-grained pricing—culminating in LMPs—within their own networks.35 
The TEM aims to create price zones that reflect transmission constraints rather than 
country boundaries, but to date many countries choose not to subdivide their country into 
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 Markets with central dispatch seem to manage LMP, while those with self-dispatch, like most 
power exchanges, argue for the liquidity of zonal pricing (in which case transmission charging needs 
to be suitably locational). In GB, some have argued that balancing charges should be nodal, so that at 
least generators face the right prices for marginal output decisions. 
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zones. Britain is a clear example where this should have happened at the Scottish border but 
does not; Norway, in contrast, has a reasonable number of separate price zones. Even in the 
absence of nodal pricing, transmission system charges can still be made locationally 
differentiated. Yet many EU countries still levy grid charges on consumers with no charges 
for generation, so there is no spatial variation and thus no or very weak locational guidance 
for new investment. 
The standard US hedging instrument for volatile nodal prices is a Transmission 
Congestion Contract for a fixed number of MW. Its strike price is set at the current best 
estimate of the nodal cost of injecting power at a particular location. For renewables, the 
contracts would need to reflect output patterns and de-rated capacity. If the generator injects 
more than the contracted amount, it receives the LMP for the extra amount; if less, it pays the 
excess up to the LMP. This hedges against the varying LMP while incentivizing the generator 
to take the LMP as the relevant price for deciding how to offer output [78]. It would also 
provide more certainty about future transmission charges and clearer locational guidance.
36
 
 
5.6. Long-term contracting and risk management 
 
As a result of their durability, generation investments are exposed to a variety of risks. This 
includes innovation reducing the cost of competing technologies, changes to future fuel 
prices, carbon prices and also those to energy policy—such as wholesale price caps, carbon 
price floors, or RES subsidies that collapse wholesale prices. The energy sector has always 
had to deal with challenges of geopolitics but increased concern over climate change and 
sustainability has created new policy risks that are difficult to hedge – leading to problems of 
“missing markets”. This means that equity investors in the energy sector are required to bear 
new risks, which raises the cost of financing the investments needed to deliver sustainability.  
These distortions have resulted in individual MSs introducing a plethora of policies. 
One is the increasing use of capacity mechanisms to support otherwise excessively risky and 
potentially commercially unattractive fossil fuel generation to be available to provide the 
system with the required firmness and flexibility. Another is the use of long-term contracts 
(or purchase contracts) to support nuclear power generation. A general problem of this 
patchwork of policies is that its complexity favours better-informed actors in the private 
sector over the governments who design them. 
Recent examples such as the planned UK nuclear plant at Hinkley Point C suggest 
that offering long-term price contracts may be a high-cost solution compared to other 
alternatives, e.g. cost-sharing in the procurement with an auction-determined price to operate 
the plant once commissioned. Governments often find it difficult to determine and negotiate 
the favourable contract terms [79]. Excessively long contract durations (e.g. 15 years for 
capacity contracts in GB) appear to reflect a lack of political faith in short-term energy and 
ancillary services markets to provide a firm basis for security of supply. 
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 While it may seem rather complicated, the TSO already has to consider the impact of new 
connections on the need for reinforcement; this just makes explicit the calculations that need to be 
done in any case. 
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An overarching goal of a “2nd generation market design” should be to achieve a 
simpler, better and more predictable policy environment that strengthens the ability of the 
electricity market to deliver supply security even with a high share of RES. Indeed, the 
mechanisms discussed above—more market integration, more granular price signals, more 
efficient RES support—would themselves likely reduce the reliance on politically-backed 
long-term contracts. While an inefficient policy casts doubt on its own durability, efficient 
policies ought to command more credibility, provided they achieve political and public 
support. 
 Higher levels of RES have already revealed the “missing money” problems of the 
current market design where conventional dispatchable plant are needed to provide reserves 
and flexibility services. Given the current extent of both “missing money” and “missing 
markets”, a capacity auction presents a market-based way to procure such plant as the system 
becomes tight. The auction uses competitive forces to determine the price of such capacity, 
with a capacity payment to be paid to generators available during stress hours. In terms of 
Principles 3 and 5, a capacity market can alleviate the “missing money” problem and reduce 
risk for conventional plant. To present a least-cost solution, it is reliant on government 
judgment on the type and amount of capacity to be procured and on the auction design 
yielding a competitive outcome given the procured capacity.
37
  
The European policy discussion on capacity mechanisms is still evolving. Within the 
class of capacity auctions, reliability options [81] may be preferable to the capacity 
mechanisms currently used in GB, Italy, Spain and other parts of Europe. Reliability options 
(ROs) have been recently proposed for the single market of the island of Ireland. They 
specify a price cap set somewhat above the variable cost of the most expensive generator; RO 
holders pay back any excess of the market price above the cap, while consumers are protected 
by the cap. Their merit is that the wholesale price can still rise to high levels, signaling the 
efficient scarcity value for trading over interconnectors and activating demand response 
measures.
38
  
 
Efficient risk allocation for RES 
 
Similar to the rise in the importance of risk management for conventional generators 
following the reforms of the 1990s, RES will need to enhance its risk-management 
capabilities in a more market-based future world. 
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 We note that there is still debate in the literature on the need for a capacity mechanism. One 
rationale is the “missing money” problem that arises from a price cap in the wholesale market [9], 
where the resulting underinvestment in conventional generation can be exacerbated by the merit order 
effect of rising variable RES generation. An alternative view is that an energy-only market combined 
with a market for operating reserves is the preferred market design [76]; the system operator then 
balances supply and demand for both energy and operating reserves (without the need for a separate 
capacity market). However, recent analysis by Léautier [80] suggests that this design is isomorphic to 
an energy-only market (with peak-load pricing)—and thus does not resolve the “missing money” 
underinvestment problem. 
38
 DG COMP has recently expressed a preference for ROs over capacity payments as they are thought 
to create the least disturbance to trading partners, as well as considerable hostility to the holding of 
strategic reserves except to address very short-run capacity shortages [13]. 
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In addition to the output risk due to fluctuations in the wind or sun, there are two 
principal kinds of risk facing RES. The first is the balancing risk that arises because output is 
still uncertain when it is contracted for sale. Renewables becoming balance-responsible 
parties would require them to predict their availability at the time of contracting (year or 
month ahead) or submitting offers into EUPHEMIA day ahead or intra-day. Over a year, 
prediction errors might roughly average out and so RES is equally likely to be short or long 
in the balancing market. If prices are higher when the market is short then RES will likely 
under-contract and spill any surpluses into the balancing market (at a slight penalty overall). 
This risk, given its predictability over time should be contractible with third parties, usually 
with a larger generating utility.
39
 
 The second risk arises in support mechanisms, such as PFiTs and the capacity 
auctions suggested above, that link revenue to the wholesale price. These are likely to be 
positively correlated with overall economic activity and fuel prices. Yet retailers face no 
greater risk buying from RES than conventional generators, so should be willing to offer 
similar contracts to both. Indeed, large integrated utilities already offer long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPAs), which are essentially fixed-price contracts with a risk premium. 
 The remaining risk facing RES is its own output risk. Averaged over a run of years, 
this is likely to be modest (even if daily and monthly fluctuations are large) and only weakly 
correlated with the stock market—and so does not lead to a significantly higher required 
return from equity investors. In sum, efficiently managed, the remaining risks to RES may 
well be modest—but the point is that they need to be managed. 
 In the future, RES may thus face greater transaction costs arising from such increased 
risk management in a more market-based world.
40
 The costs of trading 24-7, while 
continuously monitoring weather forecasts and optimizing positions, would be significant 
relative to the size of the average wind farm. This would benefit from aggregators taking on 
that task (Principle 5). In Spain, for example, the system operator actively monitors wind 
output; more broadly, system operators would be well-placed to help aggregate and manage 
risk.
41
  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The rise of variable RES generation under the current EU electricity market design has 
exposed a variety of problems that can largely be traced back to issues of “missing money” 
and “missing markets”. One of the main problems is that of system (frequency) instability 
caused by the fall in the share of synchronous generation , which is more acute for smaller 
isolated systems that are not AC-interconnected with the huge inertia of the Continental 
system. We have argued that these challenges are not insurmountable in that an improved 
                                                        
39
 This is supported by the estimates of Gowrisankaran et al. [82] that the non-perfect forecastability 
of variability accounts for less than 5% of the overall social costs of solar PV (in Arizona, USA)—
while variability itself accounts for more than 30% (in the absence of storage). 
40
 RES and conventional generation are increasingly becoming integrated under the same roof within 
an incumbent electricity company—which opens up additional risk-management considerations. 
41
 See http://www.ree.es/en/press-office/infographs-and-maps/control-centre-of-renewable-energies-
%28cecre%29  
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market design can incentivize a range of extra sources of flexibility. We have set out 
economic principles to guide the transition to a new design, and suggested policies such as 
supporting more interconnection and better remuneration of flexibility services that can 
facilitate this transition. While these challenges are shared across the EU, individual Member 
States are in different positions, partly depending on how closely their resource base of 
variable RES generation is aligned with their patterns of electricity demand. 
 We conclude our review by offering some broader reflections on the future high-RES 
world and policy design within it. A wider potential implication of our proposal to shift RES 
support to being based on capacity—so as to more directly incorporate its learning spillovers 
(Principle 1)—is that the EU’s RES targets themselves may also better be specified in terms 
of the capacity share of renewables (not their output share). This capacity share would have 
to be suitably de-rated, to ensure comparability across different types of RES generation—as 
well as a cost-efficient overall RES portfolio. 
While we suggested that increased interconnection brings substantial benefits to the 
high-RES system as a whole, the allocation of the costs and benefits of the interconnector 
between the two parties remains a challenge. Its beneficiaries are consumers in high-price 
regions and producers in low-price regions, together with the broad benefits of greater supply 
security, and lower system cost. Ensuring that interconnector owners are remunerated for all 
the services they provide would go some way to resolve this problem, provided other tariffs 
are set at efficient levels. Reallocating the shared costs of the interconnectors in proportion to 
those who benefit might also assist with a fairer allocation of the total benefit. 
For grid-scale batteries, a major question is whether those batteries that make sense 
from a system viewpoint can find a viable business model. A battery provides multiple 
sources of value to the system (e.g., deferral of transmission and distribution upgrades, 
reserve capacity, frequency response services). This requires monetization of multiple 
revenue streams, which are currently variously regulated and market-based. Many of the 
sources of value of a grid-scale storage facility are local and subject to detailed power flow 
modeling; hence their valuation and subsequent contract design remains challenging across 
Europe. Viable business models may require a reconsideration of who can own and operate 
grid and distribution-scale batteries, given that current EU unbundling rules restrict the ability 
of network companies to own and operate such facilities. Improved network models 
combined with real-time monitoring and the development of standard contracts offer the 
prospect of reduced transaction costs—but will likely require considerable investment and 
experimentation to realize their potential. 
Distributed generation, in combination with batteries, may pose even more difficult 
payment allocation problems. Then richer customers with batteries will be able to actually 
reduce their use of the network, making it inevitable that either poorer customers pay more or 
tariffs will need reform to require higher fixed charges and time-varying energy charges 
closer to the wholesale level. Batteries with DG will clearly expose any arbitrage 
opportunities within the existing charging methodologies for both power and network use; as 
we have argued, it is important that these reflect value differences, not incidental cross-
subsidies arising from poor tariff design. 
Future emphasis could shift to mobilizing funds at the EU level to support RD&D of 
immature but promising technologies. Some estimates suggest that the financial support of 
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major EU countries to RES deployment has exceeded that to R&D by a factor of over 100 
[83, Figure 2] while the social returns to R&D have been estimated to be higher than to 
deployment returns [84]. This mobilization could perhaps be funded by MS contributions 
proportional to GDP or energy consumption. 
 
A radically different electricity market design? 
 
Over the long run, how to genuinely decentralize investment decisions around the quantity 
and type of generation to the private sector remains a key design problem for all electricity 
markets wishing to decarbonize. From 1990 to the mid-2000s, Europe successfully created a 
competitive wholesale market that privatized decision-making and risk management around 
new generation. Since then, governments have re-emerged as the major driving force behind 
the choice of the level and technology of investment.  
A radically different future design may emerge via experimentation and the evolution 
of new technologies. A genuine market in low-carbon electricity may require a degree of 
financial and ownership integration between retailers and generators that is very different 
from the today’s high degree of separation. It may also require very different contractual 
relationships between electricity consumers and retailers, which ensure the financing of long-
term investments at reasonable cost and reflect the more distributed nature of generation. The 
ability and willingness of governments to let the private sector deliver such solutions will 
vary. This suggests the emergence of wider variation in the degree of government control of 
the electricity sector than was established by the single market project in the mid-2000s. 
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